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Predispute consumer arbitration has sparked 
energetic debate and sharp divides over the 
utility of the class action versus the utility 
of individual arbitration. Thus far, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has given a 
“thumbs up” approach to predispute con-
sumer arbitration waivers, which almost al-
ways include a class waiver agreement. In 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. 
S. 333, 347–48 (2011), the Supreme Court 
implicitly approved predispute class-action 
waivers, when it held that the Federal Ar-
bitration Act (FAA) preempted California 
state law, which tended to hold such agree-
ments unconscionable in consumer cases. 
Then in American Express Company v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 
2309 (2013), the Court rejected the argu-
ment that aggregate, or class litigation, is 
necessary to preserve the opportunity to vin-
dicate low-value, statutory claims. Congress 
showed little interest in amending the FAA, 
even for consumer cases. It seemed that con-
sumer arbitration was the “wild west” of the 
law, in that it was largely unregulated and 
could direct claims to the black hole of pri-
vate dispute resolution.
The CFPB Proposes an Arbitration 
Prohibition
But then entered the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB). In May 2016, 
the CFPB issued a proposed rule prohibiting 
predispute arbitration agreements in provid-
ing consumer financial services products. 
This rule would prohibit mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in consumer 
agreements for items such as checking or 
savings accounts, credit cards, student loans, 
payday loans, automobile leases, debt man-
agement services, some payment process-
ing services, other types of consumer loans, 
prepaid cards, and consumer debt collection. 
The rule would also prohibit predispute ar-
bitration agreements in connection with pro-
viding a consumer report or credit score to a 
consumer or referring applicants to creditors 
to whom requests for credit may be made.
Ironically, the CFPB chose to exclude the 
federal government, its affiliates, and state 
governments when providing consumer fi-
nancial products or services, permitting the 
government to enter into private arbitra-
tion class waivers, whereas private industry 
cannot. The rule includes other exclusions, 
such as for brokers under the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The proposed rule prohibits covered pro-
viders from “rely[ing] in any way on a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement” in connec-
tion with “any aspect of a class action that 
is related to any of the consumer financial 
services or products” covered by the rule 
after the final rule’s effective date. The pro-
hibition does not apply if the presiding court 
has ruled that the case may not proceed as 
a class action and the time for interlocutory 
appellate review has passed. 
For consumer arbitration agreements en-
tered into after the effective date, the pro-
posed rule requires the following arbitration 
agreement language: “We agree that neither 
we nor anyone else will use this agreement 
to stop you from being part of a class action 
case in court. You may file a class action in 
court or you may be a member of a class ac-
tion even if you do not file it.”
The effective compliance date will be 
211 days after publication of the final rule 
in the Federal Register. The Dodd-Frank 
Act requires that any proposed rule apply 
only to agreements entered into 180 days 
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after the rule’s effective date, which is pro-
posed as 30 days. 
The proposed rule also provides for cer-
tain reporting requirements of arbitration re-
sults to the CFPB for any consumer arbitra-
tion that does occur, presumably when the 
consumer elects to choose arbitration over 
class actions. The provider must report the 
initial claim and counterclaim, the arbitra-
tion agreement, the judgment or award, if 
any, and any communication received from 
an arbitrator or arbitral service regarding a 
provider’s failure to pay required fees or a 
finding that the arbitration agreement is out 
of compliance with the arbitral service’s 
fairness principles or due process rules. 
In support of the rule, CFPB Director Cor-
dray touted the benefits of the class action for 
consumers, claiming that consumer financial 
services “group lawsuits delivered, on aver-
age, about $220 million in payments to 6.8 
million consumers per year.” But the CFPB’s 
decision to require class resolution as supe-
rior dispute resolution vehicle to individual 
arbitration is not necessarily supported by 
the findings of the CFPB’s empirical arbitra-
tion study. Why are the study results so im-
portant? The Dodd-Frank Act delegates rule-
making authority on arbitration in consumer 
financial products and services to the CFPB, 
but any rules promulgated “must be consis-
tent with the [arbitration] study.” 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5518(b) (emphasis added).
The CFPB Ban on Class Arbitration 
Waivers—What’s Happening Now
As noted above, the CFPB published the 
proposed rule banning the use of class ar-
bitration waivers in May 2016. The notice-
and-comment period ended August 22, 
2016. The CFPB was flooded with nearly 
13,000 comments on the proposed rule, 
both in favor of the rule and against it. A 
number of consumer financial services rep-
resentatives stated that the CFPB’s rule will 
effectively end the viability of consumer 
arbitration. Put simply, without the “carrot” 
of a class arbitration waiver, a company has 
no incentive to offer, much less to cover the 
costs of, individual consumer arbitration. 
Prior to the presidential election, most 
folks thought the CFPB would publish the 
proposed rule rather quickly. Even after 
the election, many predicted that the CFPB 
would publish the final rule banning class 
waivers in consumer arbitration agreements 
before President Trump’s inauguration. As 
of the date of this article, the CFPB’s fall 
2016 regulatory agenda identifies February 
2017 as the target date for publication of 
the final arbitration rule. But surprisingly, 
the CFPB has not published a final rule yet. 
There are a number of reasons the CFPB 
may delay publishing the final rule. First, 
one might expect any rule so blatantly an-
tibusiness to draw the attention of Presi-
dent Trump, which could cause a flutter of 
tweets or other social media ire. 
Second, the CFPB’s previously imper-
vious structure is now in question. In Oc-
tober 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia in PHH Corp. v. 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
839 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016), 
declared the directorship of the CFPB, set 
up to be unaccountable to the executive, un-
constitutional. The D.C. Circuit analyzed 
the enormous power this single-director 
structure gave the CFPB:
The CFPB’s concentration of enor-
mous executive power in a single, un-
accountable, unchecked Director not 
only departs from settled historical 
practice, but also poses a far greater 
risk of arbitrary decision-making and 
abuse of power, and a far greater threat 
to individual liberty, than does a multi-
member independent agency.
. . . 
This new agency, the CFPB, lacks 
that critical check and structural con-
stitutional protection, yet wields vast 
power over the U.S. economy. So “this 
wolf comes as a wolf.”
Id. at *4 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J. dis-
senting)). The D.C. Circuit chose to rem-
edy the CFPB’s structural flaw not by 
shutting down the CFPB, but by electing 
the narrower remedy of severing the “for-
cause” director removal provision, making 
the CFPB director removable at the will of 
the president. The ramifications of this de-
cision certainly affect the CFPB’s unwieldy 
power, but the extent of that weakening re-
mains to be seen.
The D.C. Circuit granted the CFPB’s pe-
tition for rehearing en banc and vacated the 
panel’s opinion on February 16, 2017. The 
en banc court hearing will be held on May 
24, 2017. This opinion will likely have a 
large effect on the scope of the CFPB, and 
current Director Cordray’s authority under 
this new administration. Even if the CFPB 
goes forward with the final rule, it is likely 
that it will face a slew of litigation from 
industry advocates who support consumer 
arbitration, which may deteriorate the ef-
fectiveness of the rule. 
In the interim, to the extent the CFPB is 
reconsidering the effectiveness of this wa-
tershed anti-arbitration rule, it could revise 
the rule to still permit consumer arbitration 
to develop, but under a regulatory regime 
that is more pro-consumer. The CFPB ar-
bitration study shows some defects in con-
sumer arbitration in its current form, but it 
also highlights some major deficits in con-
sumer class actions. 
The CFPB Arbitration Study: What is 
Working In Consumer Arbitration, What 
is Not
In 2015, the CFPB finished its multiyear 
study of consumer financial arbitration be-
fore the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) and of class actions based on con-
sumer financial services. Although the CFPB 
states that the study shows “that class actions 
provide a more effective means for consum-
ers to challenge problematic practices” by 
financial services companies, the results are 
not quite so conclusive. The Arbitration Re-
port showed:
•	 Over the three-year period of 2010–2012, 
consumers filed an average of 411 claims 
for arbitration in consumer financial ser-
vices products. This is abysmally low. 
•	 Of the 1,060 arbitration filings studied, 
about 60 percent settled or ended in a 
manner consistent with settlement. Only 
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32 percent were resolved on the mer-
its. This settlement figure suggests that 
some sort of resolution is being achieved 
prior to a merits decision in consumer 
arbitration.
•	 Consumers had access to attorneys. 
Counsel represented consumers in nearly 
60 percent of the cases. Companies, of 
course, nearly always had counsel. 
•	 It appears that attorneys with arbitration 
experience are representing these consum-
ers. Repeat player attorneys represented 
consumers in 50 percent of filings across 
all consumer financial services product 
markets. Forty-five percent of those fil-
ings were by “heavy” consumer repeat 
players, meaning the attorney appeared 
in four of more arbitration disputes in the 
three-year study period. For student loan 
disputes, heavy repeat player law firms 
represented 93 percent of consumers. 
•	 Dispute resolution is not a primary con-
cern for consumer choice. When asked 
about factors that are important in se-
lecting a credit card, no consumer raised 
dispute resolution. When asked, in a 
telephone survey, what one would do if a 
credit card company charged an improp-
er fee, most respondents commonsensi-
cally answered he or she would cancel 
the credit card. Less than 2 percent men-
tioned seeking legal advice or suing, but 
10 percent said they would refer the issue 
to a governmental agency. 
What does this information tell us about 
consumer arbitration? Well, first it tells us 
that consumers are not pursuing consumer 
arbitration at all, which is troubling. Are 
consumers scared of arbitration? Unwary of 
the procedure? Cynical of recovery? Or are 
the arbitration fees still too high to make it 
worth pursuing? The AAA currently caps a 
consumer’s fees in consumer arbitration at 
$200. The business portion of a consumer 
arbitration, regardless of who initiates it, is 
$1,700, plus an additional $750 arbitrator 
compensation fee. Some businesses agree 
to fully pay the costs of consumer arbitra-
tion in the arbitration agreement, and some 
“consumer-friendly” agreements even of-
fer to pay a premium and/or attorneys’ fees 
if the consumer receives an arbitral award 
that is greater than the business’s last settle-
ment offer. The Arbitration Study did not 
report on how often an arbitrator awards 
such “incentivizing premiums,” but one 
would think their very presence encourages 
settlements. 
The Arbitration Study also tells us that 
for the few consumer cases being pursued, 
consumers have access to attorney repre-
sentation. The attorneys who tend to rep-
resent consumers in this dispute have de-
veloped a cottage niche, no doubt because 
they are familiar with the AAA Consumer 
Arbitration Rules and procedure. Finally, 
the settlement figures tell us that something 
useful is occurring in consumer arbitration. 
In some way, perhaps due to the business-
side costs of consumer arbitration or incen-
tivizing premiums, parties are likely reach-
ing a settlement resolution prior to a merits 
decision. 
The study also reported “win” rates for 
affirmative consumer claims and for busi-
ness claims. Remember that only 32 per-
cent of the cases filed resulted in an arbitra-
tor decision on the merits, thus the sample 
size is very low. For claims brought by 
consumers that resulted in a decision on 
the merits, consumers “won” some kind 
of relief in about 20 percent of the cases 
(32/158). Businesses “won” relief in over 
90 percent of the business-brought cases 
(227/244) that went to a merits decision, 
although some of the decisions were simi-
lar to a default judgment. 
But one cannot make an assessment of 
arbitration by simply comparing consumer 
win rates to business win rates. As stated 
above, the sample size of merits decision 
was very small. More importantly, the 
study shows that most arbitration disputes 
resolved in a manner consistent with settle-
ment. Additionally, differing incentives to 
assert claims can explain some of the dif-
ference in outcomes. If a business funds all 
or most of the dispute resolution process, 
consumers are incentivized to bring claims 
of questionable merit. Yet for the business 
which must pay all or most of the upfront 
costs ($1,700 per consumer claim under 
AAA rules), the incentive is to not bring 
(1) low value claims or (2) claims of ques-
tionable merit. Any comparative “win” rate 
of consumers to businesses would need to 
be compared to how consumers fare in liti-
gation, not just how consumers fare com-
pared to businesses, a point the Arbitration 
Study made.
The CFPB Arbitration Study: What It 
Tells Us About Individual Consumer 
Recovery in Class Actions
The CFPB Consumer Arbitration Study 
also examined class action recovery in con-
sumer financial class actions. Although the 
CFPB concluded, in proposing its arbitra-
tion class-waiver ban, that consumers are 
better off preserving the class action than 
waiving it, the study results do not support 
this conclusion. For example, the CFPB 
Arbitration Study found that approximately 
60 percent of the consumer financial prod-
ucts class actions filed ended in a non-class 
settlement or potential non-class settlement 
(i.e., withdrawal or dismissal by the plain-
tiff). Only 12 percent (69 cases) reached 
an approved class-action settlement. This 
means that only a very small portion of 
class actions filed resulted in any damages 
to the class-member consumer. Yet those 
class actions filed do result in a societal 
drain on judicial resources and corporate 
class action defense costs (which we would 
assume are passed on in one form or other 
to the consumer). Attorneys’ fees awarded 
to counsel in class action settlements dur-
ing the relevant time frame were $424 mil-
lion, which is estimated at about 24 percent 
of total class payments and 16 percent of 
gross relief (proposed cash relief and in 
kind relief).
Second, the average claims rate (claims 
made as a percentage of eligible class mem-
bers) was low, 21 percent, with an 8 percent 
median. Thus, even when consumers ob-
tain a settlement through the class device, 
they usually do not take the administra-
tive steps to obtain the payout. Finally, the 
CFPB study did not attempt to provide data 
on the average class member recovery for 
those 69 cases that reached class settlement 
or the difficulty of obtaining settlement 
proceeds. But even taking Directory Cor-
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dray’s slogan of an average of “about $220 
million in payments to 6.8 million consum-
ers per year in consumer financial services 
cases,” one could estimate this results in 
about $32.35 in recovery to the individual 
per year, that is, if he or she takes the time 
to read and fill out the cumbersome forms 
required for claims-made recovery. These 
statistics cause one to at least question the 
effectiveness of the class action for provid-
ing individual relief to the class members. 
The CFPB Could Take a More Moderate 
Approach to Facilitate Transparent and 
Free Consumer Arbitration
What should we make of the data provided 
above? First, it is premature to conclude that 
the class action is a more effective dispute 
resolution platform than individual arbitra-
tion. When only 12 percent of cases filed 
results in any class settlement, it suggests 
that there is a significant waste in the system. 
Second, we know arbitration is chilling con-
sumer activity. The CFPB could confront this 
by providing more consumer education on 
arbitration and requiring more transparency. 
The CFPB could implement data-reporting 
requirements (similar, but more extensive 
than, those in the proposed rule for essen-
tially post-dispute arbitration) that require re-
porting of the types of claims made, demand 
amounts, counterclaims and amounts, case 
resolutions, product types, and information 
about consumer representation. 
The CFPB should require any consumer 
arbitration to be fully business-funded at 
no cost to the consumer. When a business 
faces transaction costs of nearly $2,000 per 
arbitration filed, repeat consumer filings will 
attract its attention. In addition, the CFPB 
could consider requiring that any consum-
er arbitration which results in a favorable 
consumer award on the merits should be 
awarded treble damages and attorneys’ fees. 
This provision would include a sort of “built 
in” incentivizing provision. The goal of this 
provision is to encourage organically what 
we already see occurring, increased settle-
ment of consumer disputes. Still further, 
the CFPB should require that any consumer 
arbitration award must result in a written 
statement of decision, which permits other 
consumers to know how the arbitrator ap-
plied the law to the facts of that case. This 
will facilitate consumer knowledge of po-
tential corporate overreach (and encourage 
more recovery), and will also help aid the 
consumer in arbitrator selection. The CFPB 
has a number of measures it could take to 
regulate consumer arbitration to the benefit 
of the consumer, short of removing a poten-
tially viable dispute resolution platform that 
could benefit the individual consumer.
Conclusion
The CFPB’s proposed anti-arbitration rule 
will have a wide effect on consumer finan-
cial services, and even potentially on other 
consumer arbitration agreements. But the 
CFPB’s arbitration class-waiver ban is es-
sentially an election of the class action to the 
expense of individual arbitration. This policy 
choice is premature and is not yet supported 
by the data. The abysmally low number of 
consumer arbitration filings is too low to 
make generic assessments regarding the ef-
ficacy of consumer arbitration. But it tells us 
consumers need to know more and have con-
fidence to pursue their own low-value claims, 
or be aware that attorney assistance may be 
available. Even still, the image the Arbitration 
Study paints of class actions show that this 
vehicle is not providing satisfactory recovery 
to the individual class members. But requir-
ing businesses to fully fund and incentivize 
consumer arbitration in a fair and transparent 
way could provide a vehicle for individual-
ized low-cost consumer relief. Will there 
still be some de minimis claims that are not 
pursued on the individual level? Yes. But this 
tradeoff may be rational in the eyes of the 
consumer to preserve an essentially free dis-
pute resolution platform for economically ra-
tional claims. The CFPB should take the time 
pending issuance of its final rule, under a new 
Executive Branch, to issue regulations that 
will make consumer arbitration more suscep-
tible to empirical study, more transparent, and 
cost free for the consumer. 
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